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“We don’t know what it is,” says co-discoverer Tom Muxlow of Jodrell Bank Centre for Astrophysics near Macclesfield, UK.

It would also grant police the power to stop and verify the immigration status of anyone they suspect of being illegal.

The bill could still face a veto from Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer. A spokesman for Ms. Brewer said she has not publicly commented on the bill. Ms. Brewer, a Republican, has argued for stringent immigration laws.

Under the measure, passed Tuesday by Arizona’s lower house, after being passed earlier by the state Senate, foreign nationals are required to carry proof of legal residency.

Immigrants’ rights groups roundly criticized the bill. “The objective is to make life miserable for immigrants so that they leave the state,” said Chris Newman, general counsel for the Los Angeles-based National Day Laborer Organizing Network. “The bill constitutes a complete disregard for the rights of nonwhites in Arizona. It effectively mandates racial profiling.”

President Obama told delegates from 47 nations at the Nuclear Security Summit on Tuesday that it would be a “catastrophe for the world” if al-Qaeda or another terrorist group got a nuclear device, because so many lives would be lost and it would be so hard to mitigate damage from the blast.

A 10-kiloton nuclear explosion would level buildings within half a mile of ground zero, generate 900-mph winds, bathe the landscape with radiation and produce a plume of fallout that would drift for hundreds of miles, the guide says. It was posted on the Internet and sent to local officials.

The document is designed to help local officials craft plans for responding to a nuclear blast. The prospect is anything but far-fetched, says Rick Nelson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Do I think in my lifetime I’ll see the detonation of a nuclear device? I do.”

One challenge he says, will be to persuade survivors to stay indoors, shielded from dangerous radiation until they’re given the all-clear or told to evacuate. “In all likelihood, families will be separated,” he says. “It’s going to be scary to sit tight, though it’s the right thing to do.”

The government’s planning scenarios envision a terrorist strike in an urban area with a 10-kiloton device, slightly smaller than the roughly 15-kiloton Hiroshima bomb. A 10-kiloton device packs the punch of 10,000 tons of TNT.

The chaos that would inevitably follow such a blast would make it difficult for the federal government to react quickly. “Emergency response is principally a local function,” the document says, though “federal assistance will be mobilized as rapidly as possible.”

The “Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation” was developed by a task force headed by the White House Homeland Security Council. It was circulated to state and local government officials and first responders in January 2009.

The report has never been formally released to the public, White House spokesman Nick Shapiro says.

It offers practical guidance to first responders and advice on radiation measurement and decontamination.

Disaster experts say local governments aren’t prepared for a nuclear attack. “There isn’t a single American city, in my estimation, that has sufficient plans for a nuclear terrorist event,” says Irwin Redlener of Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health.

Continued legal appeals will delay or block the first public look at details of the central bank’s $2 trillion in emergency lending during the 2008 financial crisis. The Clearing House Association LLC, a group that includes Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., joined the Fed in defense of a lawsuit brought by Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg News, seeking release of records related to four Fed lending programs.

The U.S. Court of Appeals in Manhattan ruled March 19 that the central bank must release the documents. A three-judge panel of the appellate court rejected the Fed’s argument that disclosure would stigmatize borrowers and discourage banks from seeking emergency help.

“Our member banks are very concerned about real-time disclosure of information that could cause a run on the banks,” said Paul Saltzman, the group’s general counsel, in an interview yesterday. “We’re not going to let the Second Circuit opinion stand without seeking a review.”

This latest filing is up 19% from March 2009’s number which occurred at the absolute nadir of the economic decline, when everyone thought the world was ending. It’s also up 35% from last month’s (February 2010) number.

This responds to the call by the leaders of the Group of 20 (G-20) economies, endorsed by the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), to increase the financing available to the Fund, through an expanded and more flexible NAB increased by up to US$500 billion. Thirteen new participants, including a number of major emerging market economies, have indicated their willingness to join 26 current participants in the NAB. The decision today follows the agreement reached by current and prospective participants at their meeting in Washington in November 2009 on the key elements of an expanded and more flexible NAB.

“The expansion and enlargement of the NAB borrowing arrangements provides a very strong multilateral foundation for the Fund’s efforts in crisis prevention and resolution, as an essential back-stop to the Fund’s quota resources. This will help ensure that the Fund has access to adequate resources to help members that are vulnerable to financial crises,” IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said.

A program set up to test beef for chemical residues “is not accomplishing its mission of monitoring the food supply for … dangerous substances, which has resulted in meat with these substances being distributed in commerce,” says the audit by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector General.

The health effects on people who eat such meat are a “growing concern,” the audit adds.

The testing program for cattle is run by the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), which also tests meat for such pathogens as salmonella and certain dangerous strains of E. coli. But the residue program relies on assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency, which sets tolerance levels for human exposure to pesticides and other pollutants, and the Food and Drug Administration, which does the same for antibiotics and other medicines.

Limits have not been set by the EPA and FDA “for many potentially harmful substances, which can impair FSIS’ enforcement activities,” the audit found.

The FSIS said in a written statement that the agency has agreed with the inspector general on “corrective actions” and will work with the FDA and EPA “to prevent residues or contaminants from entering into commerce.”

Even when the inspection service does identify a lot of beef with high levels of pesticide or antibiotics, it often is powerless to stop the distribution of that meat because there is no legal limit for those contaminants.

In 2008, for example, Mexican authorities rejected a U.S. beef shipment because its copper levels exceeded Mexican standards, the audit says. But because there is no U.S. limit, the FSIS had no grounds for blocking the beef’s producer from reselling the rejected meat in the United States.

Before Washington Mutual collapsed in the largest bank failure in U.S. history, its executives knowingly created a “mortgage time bomb” by making subprime loans they knew were likely to go bad and then packaging them into risky securities, a congressional investigation has found.

In some cases, the bank took loans in which it had discovered fraudulent activity — such as misstated income by borrowers — and rolled them into mortgage securities sold to investors without disclosing the fraud, according to the report released Monday by the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

The actions were driven in part by greed, according to the committee report, which pointed out that WaMu’s pay practices rewarded loan officers and processors based on how many mortgages they could churn out.

The new disclosures could give a boost to efforts by President Obama and congressional Democrats to pass sweeping overhaul of financial regulations, which the Senate is set to consider this spring, said Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the subcommittee’s chairman.

“Washington Mutual built a conveyor belt that dumped toxic mortgage assets into the financial system like a polluter dumping poison into a river,” Levin said. “Using a toxic mix of high-risk lending, lax controls and destructive compensation policies, Washington Mutual flooded the market with shoddy loans and securities that went bad. . . . It is critical to acknowledge that the financial crisis was not a natural disaster, it was a man-made economic assault.”

WaMu’s failure is also under investigation by the Justice Department. The Seattle-based thrift, which was seized by federal regulators in September 2008 and sold to JPMorgan Chase & Co. for $1.9 billion, had nearly a third of its 2,200 branches in California and was a major player, along with rival Countrywide Financial Corp., in helping fuel the state’s housing boom.

According to the Senate report, WaMu executives were aware in 2006 of problems at its Southern California subprime unit, Long Beach Mortgage Co. Excerpts of internal e-mails and reports offer a stark and unvarnished view of the warning signs that were dismissed as the bank tumbled toward failure.

The company’s chief risk officers called Long Beach Mortgage, the subprime subsidiary the firm used to stage its rapid growth in home lending, “a real problem for WaMu.” Stephen Rotella, WaMu’s former chief operating officer, described the unit as “terrible.”

“Short story is this is not good,” David Schneider, WaMu’s former president of home loans, wrote in a December 2006 e-mail. “We are all rapidly losing credibility as a management team.”

Long Beach Mortgage was founded by the late Roland E. Arnall, a West Los Angeles billionaire who later built Ameriquest Mortgage Co. and its sister companies into the nation’s largest subprime operation.

Washington Mutual acquired the bulk of Long Beach Mortgage — the part that offered loans through brokers, not through its own employees — in 1999.

Long Beach Mortgage’s lending reflected the general disintegration of standards across the industry, said Paul Muolo, executive editor of National Mortgage News and co-author of “Chain of Blame,” a 2008 book about the mortgage meltdown. Companies such as Orange-based Ameriquest, Irvine’s New Century Financial Corp. and San Jose’s First Franklin Financial Corp. competed for ever riskier subprime loans that Wall Street banks transformed into mortgage bonds and sold around the world.

“It’s hard to say which lender went berserk first,” Muolo said, as the subprime rivals wound up adopting the philosophy “If he or she breathes, we will make the loan.”

The subcommittee’s investigators, who conducted more than 100 interviews and depositions and collected 50 million documents, found that Washington Mutual jumped headlong into subprime and other risky lending in 2003 to increase profits.

The company and its Long Beach unit “used shoddy lending practices . . . to make tens of thousands of high-risk home loans that too often contained excessive risk, fraudulent information or errors,” according to a subcommittee memo.

Internal company documents highlighted the profit pressures. “In 2007, we must find new ways to grow our revenue. Home Loans Risk Management has an important role to play in that effort,” read a late 2006 message from the unit’s chief risk officer to the risk management team.

Adding to the problems, WaMu and Long Beach Mortgage frequently steered borrowers who qualified for prime loans into subprime loans, the subcommittee found. WaMu then spread the risk of those loans and riskier ones to investors by packaging the subprime loans into $77 billion worth of securities it sold to investors, the panel found.

“At times, WaMu selected and securitized loans that it had identified as likely to go delinquent,” the report said.

A June 2008 review by the bank’s main regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, found a “culture focused more heavily on production volume rather than quality.”

Top employees could become members of the company’s President’s Club, which offered lavish, all-expense-paid trips to Hawaii or the Caribbean, the subcommittee found.

Levin said the findings showed the need for a new consumer financial protection agency, which Obama has proposed as part of his regulatory overhaul, to stop lenders from preying on borrowers. “The bottom line is that WaMu had poor policies, poor controls, inadequate oversight of its loans [and] turned out toxic mortgages that sunk the bank, devastated homeowners and polluted the financial system like a poison,” Levin said. “This was a Main Street bank that got taken in by these Wall Street profits.”

JPMorgan, which acquired WaMu, had no comment on the report.

On Tuesday, the Senate subcommittee launches a series of hearings looking at WaMu’s 2008 failure as a case study of the financial crisis. Former WaMu executives are scheduled to testify Tuesday, with testimony Friday from regulators and later this month from credit rating firms and investment banks that also contributed to the bank’s problems.